



BEYOND THE EIDETICS OF LIVING BEINGS: 
CONTINGENCY, PLASTICITY, INDIVIDUALITY
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1. The question of plastic form and its epistemological significance
In Knowledge of Life George Canguilhem writes that «[i]t is quite difficult for the philosopher to try his hand at biological philosophy 
without running the risk of compromising the biologists he uses or cites» 
[Canguilhem 1952/2008, 59]. At the same time, as if he would like to 
respond to the objection that «[a] biology utilized by a philosopher» is 
«a philosophical biology, and therefore a fanciful one», he asks: «Yet 
would it nevertheless be possible, without rendering biology suspect, 
to ask of it an occasion, if not permission, to rethink or rectify funda-
mental philosophical concepts, such as that of life? Can one reproach 
the philosopher who has taken up the study of biology for choosing, 
among the teachings he has received, the one that has best enlarged and 
organized his thought?» [Canguilhem 1952/2008, 59]. It seems to be 
a rhetorical question which nevertheless exonerates the philosopher as 
innocent declaring the need of a kind of a metabiological approach in 
the biological problems which can be performed by the philosopher who 
assumes the task of the inquiry of living reality. In my opinion, such a 
kind of metabiological duty is achievable through a fruitful dialogue 
of metaphysics, phenomenology and morphology, inasmuch as each of 
these disciplines aims at the investigation of life. Establishing such a 
dialogue I will try here to give preferences to those positions which de-
fend the role of contingency. Therefore, I will follow the principle that 
saving (living) phenomena means saving their contingency and, hence, 
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their plasticity and their individuality.1 From this point of view my at-
tempt will focus on two questions which are strictly connected.
The first one concerns the notion of form as plastic. The second one 
regards the epistemological significance of the question of plastic form.
As concerns the first question, I would like to analyse the question 
of the form as plastic from an ontological point of view using Franz 
Brentano’s reading of the Aristotelian concept of eidos. In his com-
mentary of the Aristotelian ontology Brentano clearly points out that 
Aristotle’s eidos is never a rigid entity, but a “plastic receptor”, bound to 
matter and distinguished – especially in living beings – by a metamor-
phic quality. It means that a living being is able to change, to develop – 
including the self-erasure processes –, if we would try to read the notion 
of steresis in the terms of dynamics of the so-called idia, defined by 
Brentano as unknown individual differences. It is the deep synergy be-
tween the notion of individual substance (tode ti) and that of form which 
allows Aristotle to elaborate a conception of living beings as absolutely 
moving, in fieri, according to his epigenetic ontogenesis emerging from 
his biological works. Such a doctrine receives still today the attention of 
authoritative biologists. For instance Ernst Mayr recognizes that «[a]fter 
all, Aristotle’s eidos had many of the properties we now ascribe to the 
genetic program» [Mayr 2004, 54],2 where the central point is that the 
genetic program shows us how a teleonomic processuality character-
izes living beings, inasmuch they are never given or entirely realized 
from their beginning as already fully accomplished entities.3 In this 
sense, I would like to take into consideration the ontological question of 
plastic form referring to Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology and Hans 
Blumenberg’s critique of it, mostly as concerns the limits of Husserl’s 
impressive research on the so called eidetische Variation. I will try to 
1  The concept of sozein should actually be discussed asking what saving a phenom-
enon means and what a phenomenon has to be kept in safe from.
2  In this context Mayr also refers to Jacob’s and Delbrück’s works [cf. Jacob 1970; 
Delbrück 1971] according to which the Aristotelian notion of eidos presents charac-
ters which are today recognized to be proper of the genetic program.
3  The kind of metaphysics which I let interact with the ontology of living being as 
emerging from the biological inquiry is far from the paradigm of a rigid preformed 
identity, even if Aristotle’s position is marked by a teleology that today’s biology 
instead abandons.
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understand the problem of eidetic variation looking at some theses of 
biology considered as morphology, namely as investigation of the form 
of living forms.
The second question, which is related to the first one, concerns the 
epistemological significance of the question of plastic form. Indeed, the 
assumption of a “mobile” ontological paradigm of the form implies the 
gnoseological question of the limits of an eidetic investigation, which 
are also the limits of the concept and of the representation as ways in 
which we try to grasp a form as a phenomenon that gives itself to us. 
The crucial gnoseological problem is transcendental since it is the ques-
tion of the conditions of possibility of the intelligibility of the form. 
I would say that such a question is definable as a problem of critical 
epistemology – as Jacques Monod would suggest [cf. Monod 1970/1972, 
37] – or as a real obstacle épistémologique, according to Gaston Ba-
chelard’s view.4 The question of the formal condition of intelligibility 
of the form as plastic is not so obvious for philosophy in times of new 
realism and actually it is already a fundamental question of the meta-
physical tradition with its conception of form as the intelligible par ex-
cellence, as the ground founding the epistemic model of knowledge as 
scire per causas. For metaphysics this implies an ontological primacy 
of necessity over contingency, namely over that which has the nature of 
plasticity as concerns both the ontological level and the notional one. In 
short, if we would like to talk about living forms essentially subjected 
to a continuous morphogenesis never definitely accomplished, then the 
question – both for the philosopher and for the life scientist – is the 
following one: what are the conditions of possibility of the knowledge 
concerning life? We are always in front of the sceptical doubt which 
insists on the fact that our knowledge is doomed to failure since an a 
4  Bachelard’s epistemological obstacle does not mean the presence of «external ob-
stacles, such as the complexity and transience of phenomena, or […] the weakness 
of the senses or of the human mind» [Bachelard 1938/2002, 24]. It consists rather 
in «sluggishness and disturbances» which appear «at the very heart of the act of 
cognition, by some kind of functional necessity» [Bachelard 1938/2002, 24]. In my 
opinion they are depending on the way of speaking through absolute metaphors (in 
Blumenberg’s sense) which characterizes the scientific knowledge and those ontolo-
gical operations which also life sciences perform.
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priori knowledge, which is able to “anticipate” (through concepts, rep-
resentations, deductions) that varied world of changing forms in which 
life consists, is impossible. Hence, the only heuristic possibilities are a 
posteriori descriptions which always remain limited and incomplete. In 
other words, our knowledge can only be a descriptive taxonomy which 
fails to account for the variation of the form according to the idea of 
knowledge as a kind of a valid knowing since it is able not only to 
declare that there are phenomena and how they are but especially why 
they are in that way.
The “why question” is still open in the field of biology since the most 
part of the genetic, phenotypic and epigenetic mutations have a casual 
character. It means that by their nature they escape the rational claim to 
identify a first principle or cause which explains why things are neces-
sarily going or have gone in a certain way. The point is not that things do 
not necessarily go in a certain way in the sphere of living beings, but that 
it can simply happen that things have gone in a certain direction rather 
than in another one. In The Epigenetics Revolution Nessa Carey refers 
to Audrey Hepburn’s health influenced by the malnutrition which she 
suffered as a child during the Dutch famine. Carey explains that
[d]ifferentiated cells remember what cell types they are, even af-
ter the signal that told them to become kidney cells or skin cells 
has long since vanished. […] Imprinted genes get switched off at 
certain stages in development, and stay off throughout the rest of 
life. Indeed, epigenetic modifications are the only known mech-
anism for maintaining cells in a particular state for exceptionally 
long periods of time [Carey 2012, 236].
Then, what is the epistemological problem? Accentuating the character 
of dependence between individuals (subsumed under the universal gen-
eralities of kinds and species to which they belong) and their specific 
classes of belonging – according to a model that life sciences import 
from the classical Aristotelian metaphysics – implies that the individ-
ual forms are “watered down”, even if we would like to look at the 
concrete reality which shows itself to our senses and gives itself to our 
heuristic reflection. The experience shows us that our knowledge of the 
individuals is not something wrong since it allows us to “get our hands” 
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(with all the problems that this obviously entails) on the world of the 
living, achieving the expected results. It is enough to consider the work 
regarding the genetic code which, properly deciphered, gives us back 
the confirmation of an invariability in the life-world, almost surpris-
ing in spite of the infinite individualities, each of them irreducible as 
concerns its own genetic makeup. The fact is that the effectiveness of 
our forecasts leads us to rely on our knowledge, but such a fact must be 
justified and understood as an epistemological question which implies 
an ontological question in itself. The epistemological question refers 
back to the ontological one, which I would formulate in these terms: if 
an intelligibility of form is possible for us, what space does contingency 
occupy in reality, what role does it play in determining the individual 
being of each living, what does it actually add in more, what does it 
entail? Is it truly conceivable as that which distinguishes itself from the 
essential core – and hence as something inessential in the determination 
of an individual – according to the Scholastic ontological distinction be-
tween substantia and accidentia by which the Aristotelian much more 
complex and problematic position is summarized? At this point, I would 
like to face the questions from the point of view that is most congenial 
to me, namely that of the metaphysical tradition with the help of Franz 
Brentano’s ontological perspective.
2. Metaphysics, phenomenology, biology in dialogue
A good starting point may be a question that Brentano poses in his com-
mentary on Aristotelian ontology, Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung 
des Seienden nach Aristoteles.
In the second chapter Brentano reads the question of the accidental 
being – one of the senses of being according to Aristotle [cf. Metaph., E, 
2, 1026a34] – and he wonders in what way the project of a general on-
tology as investigation of the being qua being is possible in front of the 
explicit Aristotelian indication that there is no science of the contingent 
since it is not possible to identify a necessary cause of it5 – for Aris-
5  The cause of the accidental is an accident itself [cf. Metaph., E, 2, 1027a8] and 
hence a science of the accident is impossible [cf. Metaph., E, 2, 1026b4 and 1027a19-
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totle a condition that defines the knowledge specifically as episteme. 
Brentano treats the question sagaciously and his proposal essentially 
anticipates Husserl’s phenomenological solution of the problem of the 
eidetische Variation. During his analysis of the matter Brentano writes:
But did we not just follow Aristotle in determining the peculiar-
ities of the on kata symbebekos, and have we not thus subjected 
it to scientific scrutiny? True enough, but one must make careful 
distinctions. The concept of the on kata symbebekos is not kata 
symbebekos relative to that to which it is attributed, just as the 
concept of an individual is not itself an individual. Though it is 
not possible to have a science of individuals, yet the concept of 
the individual and its relation to species, etc., can be scientif-
ically discussed. An individual in general can be divided into 
individual substance and individual accident. In the same way 
the impossibility of scientific scrutiny of things which are kata 
symbebekos does not vitiate the possibility of scrutinizing sci-
entifically what kata symbebekos einai is [Brentano 1862/1975, 
11-12].
We can find a confirmation for the fact that for Brentano it is possible to 
bypass the ban imposed by Aristotle, as we read in the just mentioned 
passage, in a very perspicuous notation where Brentano affirms that the 
ontological relationship – the «close affinity» [Brentano 1862/1975, 7] – 
between independent being and accidental being follows the same close 
relationship between kind and difference in the definition, even if acci-
dental being does not constitute the specific difference that is anyway a 
determination inscribed in «the essence of the other [scil. of the kind]» 
[Brentano 1862/1975, 7]. And about accidental being he adds: «But cas-
es where it serves in a definition in the place of the unknown difference 
are not particularly rare, and it is often of service when we try to find 
the latter. The proprium (idion) of the Topics is in this way united with a 
being [Wesen]» [Brentano 1862/1975, 7-8]. In other words, the individu-
26] since the object of a science is a necessary reality, a reality which is always or 
for the most part, while the accident is never that. This epistemological criterion 
implies that we can have an empirical experience of the accident but not an epistemic 
knowledge.
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ality of each individual person worsens, compacts, thickens in the prop-
er features or ontological traits that are often completely accidental, in 
the sense that they do not change the intimate nature (essence, Wesen) of 
the individual if they change and nevertheless they show the difference 
– which Brentano defines as unknown – existing between individuals 
belonging to the same kind and the same species. This classic position 
of traditional ontology actually seems to be aware of the ontological 
force of accident despite the chablon according to which metaphysics 
would be essentialist at the expense of the contingent nature of reality. 
With the appropriate differences such a position can also be considered 
a good philosophical transcription of what biology teach us about the 
evolutionary processes that lead to final results arising from «an inter-
action of numerous incidental factors» [Mayr 2004, 33]. In this way, 
Mayr clearly affirms that «[c]hance with respect to functional and adap-
tive outcome is rampant in the production of variation» [Mayr 2004, 
33]. Perhaps it is not so interesting, given that we consider evolution on 
a population and non-individual level. But on an individual level the 
things are not very different since «[d]uring meiosis, in the reduction 
division it [scil. chance] governs both crossing-over and the movement 
of chromosomes» [Mayr 2004, 33], namely those processes which in the 
sexual reproduction of the living preside over the emerging of different 
individuals of the same species, different from their parents and differ-
ent from each other, even if they are born of the same parents.
Returning to Brentano’s analysis, he specifies that in order to under-
stand how things concerning an individual substance are we need the 
specific difference – namely the species that articulates the belonging 
of that individual substance to a kind – as well as an even more precise 
degree of distinction, although changeable, plastic, iridescent, depend-
ing on the givenness of unnecessary conditions of being, as concerns 
the individuation of the traits of the species, but unique and individually 
embodied so that each individual is distinguished from others of the 
same species. These traits are not the result of a need that presides over 
the ontogenesis of the individual, even if they are undoubtedly bound to 
the genetic belonging of a specimen to one species and not to another.
We can describe this fact ontologically in the following way: be-
ing a philosopher does not belong to the eidos of Socrates as a human 
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being, but being a philosopher is a trait in Socrates that however dis-
tinguishes him essentially. To anyone who asked what “Socrates” is, 
without knowing that Socrates is the proper name of a human being, 
we could legitimately respond: “Socrates is a philosopher!”, bypassing 
the need to specify that Socrates is a human being. This is because 
the determination of being a philosopher is inscribed as an ontological 
possibility in the human being Socrates and Socrates is just a human 
being and not a horse, who does not have the faculty of philosophizing 
by nature. Such an example gives a vivid image of what for its part the 
morphology of the living beings shows us. As a matter of fact, we here 
move in the sphere of phenotypic plasticity. In their essay Phenotypic 
plasticity in development and evolution: facts and concepts [2010] Fu-
sco and Minelli present the state of affairs to us. The idea of a complete-
ly passive condition of living forms as exposed to evolutionary forces 
must be balanced not only with the self-organizing ability of the living 
being, but also with its disposition as a system able to self-regulate and 
to keep homeostasis unchanged as well as with its ability to heal alter-
ations (e.g., epigenetics) which it may encounter in relation to a certain 
environmental relationship. Such an activity of the living being occurs 
also at a phenotypic level: the phenotypic evolution depends on the phe-
notypic variation and in multicellular organisms the phenotypic varia-
tion is to be read as «variation in developmental trajectories throughout 
the ontogeny» [Fusco & Minelli 2010, 547]. Hence, «[a]n individual 
organism’s trajectory is the result of a unique interaction between its 
genome(s), the temporal sequence of external environments to which it 
is exposed during its life and random events at the level of molecular 
interactions in its tissues» [Fusco & Minelli 2010, 547]. It means: ran-
domness does not play a merely accessory role in the determination of 
the living being. On the contrary, it is an essential component of the 
constitution of the living being according to its plastic development. 
This thesis of the biological inquiry concerning the morphological, 
physiological and behavioural plasticity of living being does not clash 
against the ontology of the singular identity pursued by philosophy with 
its tools.
The ontological perspective emerging from Brentano’s position 
allows us to underline the sense of a modus essendi of the living be-
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ing, namely its irreducible plasticity lying at the core of its essence. Its 
plasticity constitutes the irrepressible element of determination, whose 
loss would imply the loss of the individual as determined singularity. 
Nevertheless, such a plasticity does not throw away the aspect of invar-
iance in variation and of unity in the diversity. Such an aspect opens to 
the epistemological possibility of an intelligibility of form as plastic. 
On the one hand, a putting in brackets of the contingent is problematic 
since the contingent binds the form of being of the living form. On the 
other hand, the presence of the contingency as a reason that supports the 
plasticity of the living does not however prevent us from observing the 
form of the living being as the ability to be “stable” and “mobile” at the 
same time. At this point we are entangled in Brentano’s epistemological 
question which he resolves by following that path which also Husserl 
will follow in dealing with the question of eidetic variation.
According to Brentano we could never have an episteme in the 
manner of a science that articulates its content in an aprioristic theory, 
namely before any empirical experience of the individual contingent, if 
it is of the individual contingent that we would like to have a science. 
Thus, Brentano respects Aristotle’s dictate. However, this limitation 
binding us to the contingent experience hic et nunc does not prevent 
us from knowing formaliter what the contingent is and, hence, from 
recognizing that we are in the presence of a particular case of contin-
gency when we are faced with single cases of it. The identification of 
the formal determinations or reasons of what the contingent is does not 
represent an operation in our knowledge that violates the Aristotelian 
principle of the impossibility of a science of the accidental since we will 
only describe the characteristics which formally, namely in a pure way 
and a priori, contingency has and which distinguish it from the neces-
sary. It does not mean determining a first cause, because such an act 
of knowledge requires that we look each time at the concrete existence 
of the contingent hic et nunc. In other words: this way of proceeding 
means the possibility of an eidetics of the contingent as such and not a 
specific doctrine of the accidentals as they give themselves in the world. 
Brentano seems to be satisfied with this solution which after all follows 
the canon of the traditional metaphysica generalis that is a general, for-
mal ontology. If it is possible to identify the defining characteristics of 
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the ontological modus of the accidental, this latter can be regarded as 
the object of an epistemic knowledge in the same way as the substance 
itself or its principles (archai) and elements (stoicheia), identified by 
Aristotle in matter, form and privation as regards the kind of the sensi-
tive substances (aisthetai ousiai) [cf. Metaph., Λ, chapters 2-4].6
In front of the same question that in phenomenology is known as 
the problem of the eidetic variation Husserl’s position is even more rad-
ical, as we can see in one of the most complex volumes of Husserliana, 
namely Zur Lehre vom Wesen und zur Methode der eidetischen Varia-
tion [cf. Husserl 2012]. As the title of the volume suggests, for Husserl 
the eidetic variation is not to be understood as an ontological fact, but 
for phenomenology it is rather a method of knowledge of the phenom-
ena in the sense that the phenomenologist recognizes that each type 
(Typus) is a variation of an eidos, but at the same time it is the indi-
vidual concretion of the pure eidos which notoriously is an unreal and 
ideal (given) phenomenon for Husserl who therefore defines himself as 
a Platonist.7 The articulation of the eidos in types has to do with the fact 
that each eidos manifests itself in the mundane sphere through adum-
brations. The Abschattungen – that we can also think of as the pheno-
type of the phenomenon (eidos) as given in flesh and blood – make the 
ideal purity of the eidos “dirty”. They do not pertain to the regime of 
the necessity of the eidos. On the contrary, they are given possibly only 
thanks to the relevance of each of them to the categorical level through 
which each type is articulated. For instance, the fact that a table has 
spatial dimensions has to do with the fact that the category of spatiality 
6  It is interesting that the criterion of variation in a permanent identity is present also 
in Aristotle as concerns the question of the principles of the individual substances. 
Indeed, he recognizes that on the one hand the principles are different for the dif-
ferent substances, but on the other hand they are universal and identical for all sub-
stances in an analogical way (kat’analoghian) [cf. Metaph., Λ, 4, 1070a31-33].
7  Cf. Husserl 1913/1983, 40-42. According to the distinction between «object» and 
«something real», an eidos (or idea) can be defined as an (ideal and hence unreal) ob-
ject and it is «an atemporal being». Such a distinction implies for Husserl an «abyss» 
between consciousness, and therefore, its eidetic object and reality: «Here, an adum-
brated being, not capable of ever becoming given absolutely, merely accidental and 
relative; there, a necessary and absolute being, essentially incapable of becoming 
given by virtue of adumbration and appearance» [Husserl 1913/1983, 111].
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concerns the material existence of the table, but not its existence idea-
liter as an essence that inhabits a material. In a sense, the adumbrations 
are determinations which do not articulate the eidetic categories. They 
are only typological determinations, and for this reason they can, ac-
cording to Husserl, easily be left out and put out through the epochè so 
that each type can be reduced to the eidos under which it is to subsume. 
Then, the effective reality does not seem to have any real power of de-
termination of the content of the eidos, whose formal determination 
derives from the work of the transcendental eidetic reduction through 
which it becomes an immanent object of a consciousness as given to 
consciousness. Indeed, eidos in Husserl’s phenomenology represents an 
absolute purification from the contingency depending very closely on 
the way in which the transcendental reduction constitutes every giv-
en phenomenon as intentioned by a conscience. The eidos appears and 
has a phenomenal status only if it enters the sphere of a consciousness. 
The entire ontology which Husserl builds in the first book of Ideas and 
which he presents as the general ontology at the base of the different re-
gional eidetics grounding the various corresponding empirical sciences 
[cf. Husserl 1913/1983] makes sense only if the eidos is grasped by the 
subject’s gaze.8
Certainly, Husserl is convinced that what is identical (the eidos) in 
different types is a universal which is responsible for the principle of uni-
ty of all single phenomena that otherwise would only be scattered among 
their shadows. The types, according to a Hegelian terminology that Hus-
serl uses, are “moments” of the eidetic general being in the sense of an 
identity that is shared between the various single concrete moments [cf. 
Husserl 2012, 14], defined by Husserl as die strenge Identität des Allge-
meinen. The fact that the eidos is a correlate given of consciousness does 
8  I have not here the possibility to discuss whether the position which poses the ego 
as condition of possibility of the phenomenality of phenomena and therefore of the ei-
dos should be defended or not according to the counter-positions that seek to free the 
phenomena from the transcendental subjectivity, as for instance Jean-Luc Marion’s 
phenomenology of donation proposes [cf. Marion 1989; 1997; 2001; 2005]. However, 
there is no doubt that the question of the ontogenesis of a phenomenon seems to con-
cern exclusively its relationship with an intentional subject and not the problem of its 
own constitution by itself.
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not mean that it has not an ontological consistency, even if it is an in-
corporeal object. It is a given that fills the eidetic intuition or that which 
Husserl also calls the “ideation as act of grasping the essence” («Ideation 
als Wesen erfassender Akt») [cf. Husserl 2012, 29]. The givenness of the 
essence is attested through or in the specific act of the ideation, but for 
Husserl there are various degrees of evidence. The apodictic evidence, 
in which an essence is fully manifest in its indubitable truth, is almost 
a sort of borderline case. However, the eidos is always that to which the 
types refer in approximation. Husserl calls this approximation variation: 
«In der Variation habe ich Selbiges, das seine wechselnden Varianten 
hat. [...] In der Veränderung habe ich ein Individuelles, das durch eine 
Zeitdauer hindurch fortdauert und in verschiedenen Phasen dieser Dau-
er wechselnde Zustände hat, es ist in jedem Moment dasselbe, aber in 
jedem Moment anders» [Husserl 2012, 219].
What is unsatisfactory in such a dialectic of sameness and change? 
The problem is not that it seems to violate the principle of non-contra-
diction, but that it assumes two ontological levels: one is that of an invar-
iance and the other is that of a changeability of traits that have then nec-
essarily to be assumed as unstable and transient traits and therefore as 
discardable in the act of ideation. This is precisely the result of a method 
by which reality is read and interpreted. On the one hand, Husserl’s phe-
nomenology recognizes the importance of an effective reality, namely 
the contingency determining the variations. On the other hand, this var-
iation is irrelevant for the purpose of grasping the essence, the eidos as 
the invariable in the variation. In this sense, such a phenomenological 
position can be considered as essentialist and every kind of essentialism 
is notoriously viewed with very little sympathy. Nevertheless, not every 
phenomenologist is an essentialist, which can be exemplified with Hans 
Blumenberg who outspokenly criticizes Husserl’s position.
3. Life-world: Blumenberg’s revisited phenomenology in dialogue  
with Goethe’s morphology
In the essay Lebenswelt und Technisierung unter Aspekten der Phäno-
menologie in Wirklichkeiten in denen wir leben Blumenberg gives us an 
extraordinarily lucid analysis concerning life-world. His departing point is 
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the following fact: «Alles, was in der Lebenswelt wirklich ist, spielt in das 
Leben hinein, wird genutzt und verbraucht, gesucht und geflohen, aber 
es bleibt in seiner Kontingenz verdeckt, d.h. nicht als auch-anders-sein-
könnend empfunden» [Blumenberg 1981/2012, 23]. Hence, a philo sophy 
that wants to be faithful to life-world needs to open up the accidental ele-
ment characterizing life. Blumenberg’s critique of Husserl’s Wesenslehre 
concerns quite evidently its reduction of the Lebenswelt in its “potential-
ity to be something other” to an “object distinguished through ideality” 
(«durch Idealität ausgezeichneter Gegenstand») [Blumenberg 1981/2012, 
25]. Indeed, in this way Husserl proposes a limit-concept of life-world 
(Grenzbegriff der Lebenwelt) which is themed as a well determined in-
variable object inasmuch as it is regarded by the “phenomenological eye” 
only as an eidos at the expense of its ontological wealth, which is instead 
contingent and multiform. Hence, Blumenberg is very explicit in declar-
ing the loss in the Wesenslehre and in the method of the eidetic reduction 
which “gains” a limit-representation (Grenz vorstellung) of life-world as 
an ahistorical (geschichtslos) reality: «[D]ie Ungebundenheit der eide-
tischen Variation [wird] zurückgeführt auf die Methodik der Beschrei-
bung» [Blumenberg 1981/2012, 25]. In other words: the various and un-
predictable content of life-world is assumed as a noetic object of possible 
cogitationes described purely and a priori according to the method of the 
eidetic description. The consequence is then the loss of the concrete hu-
man being (der konkrete Mensch) in its infinite and open morphogenesis 
of its Self, always susceptible to metamorphosis, since such an eidetic 
doctrine chains the human being to a static and rigid figure, namely to an 
invariable eidetic representation.9
9  Cusinato highlights the problematic nature of an eidetics of the living being, whose 
«identity cannot be thought as substance which remains always the same» [Cusinato 
2018, 33; all the quotations from this work are my own translation]. The science, which 
has an eidetic constitution as epistemic knowledge, has the limit of «focusing attention 
on the general, the repeatable, the reversible, excluding the singular, the unpredictable, 
the irreversible» [Cusinato 2018, 33]. On the one hand, Cusinato shows the “positivity” 
of Husserl’s eidetic variation since it is a restriction for the variation which is not posed 
by the subject, but which is «given objectively by the phenomenon itself» [Cusinato 
2018, 122]. In that sense, such a constraint constitutes the essence of the real, concrete 
phenomenon. On the other hand, Cusinato points out that the living being, and special-
ly the person, is the transgression of the variation since it is an «open destination […] 
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The most relevant problem, however, is that Husserl’s eidetic varia-
tion considers contingency only in relation to the need for the position of 
a given eidos. In this way contingency does not count as an ontological 
manner of phenomena free from any eidetic determining pre-givenness 
(Vorgegebenheit). Despite the aim of revealing life-world in its irreduc-
ibility to the order of the necessary, Husserl presents the Lebenswelt 
as the object of a theoretical description which implies the epochè of 
contingency that is precisely the trait of the unpredictable variability 
in life-world impossible to be deleted according to Blumenberg. Since 
for him a radical phenomenology should lead to a Forcierung der Kon-
tingenz [cf. Blumenberg 1981/2012, 48] he promotes a revision of the 
Husserlian concept of life-world which would be a betrayal of the spirit 
of phenomenology as openness to the phenomena as such inasmuch as 
Husserl’s concept of life-world is the result of the methodical instrument 
of reduction which seeks the “unbreakable sameness in the otherness” 
of the general essence,10 namely the invariable form of each phenome-
non (including world and life) purified from any accidental character.
Blumenberg’s revision seems to be much more generous to the con-
crete, effective life-word than Husserl’s methodological path, but it pos-
es us again in front of the question of the conditions of possibility of a 
knowledge of life that could be able in some way to mend the tear with 
the reality that the essential eidetic nature of the scientific model of 
knowledge produces. In a sense, the epistemic knowledge of life cannot 
renounce its eidetic structure since that element of invariance, of stabil-
ity, is proper of reality that is not limited to being a confused self-con-
non-deductible from an already accomplished eidos» [Cusinato 2018, 124]: «It is possi-
ble to develop the concept of identity by resorting to Husserl’s eidetic variation. In this 
case, identity becomes a material constraint for the possibilities of variation of the Self. 
Nevertheless, a personal singularity is just that which can overcome such constraints 
by a self-transcending. In this way it can express its own physiognomy» [Cusinato 
2018, 12]. From an epistemological point of view such an ontological condition means 
that our knowledge of life has to consider the variation as free from ontological, strictly 
determined rules. In his critique of a pure eidetics of life Blumenberg underlines the 
impossibility of previsions concerning the variation because of the contingent charac-
ter of the variation itself and the role of the chance in it.
10  Blumenberg’s interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology outlines Husserl as an 
essentialist thinker.
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tradictory chaos. Every phenomenon shows itself in its essence. This 
main thesis in phenomenology determines its eidetic approach to the 
phenomenal world. Nevertheless, at the same time, in order to be on the 
side of life-world, our knowledge must take into account that variable 
rhythm which is proper to the life and which emerges from the nature 
of living beings, as Blumenberg points out. We can for instance refer to 
those processes of speciation which represent an ontological dynamic 
of development in the life-world between permanence and uniqueness. 
Such processes give us a vital and moving image of living reality which 
structurally is always open to a constant novelty as well discussed by 
Sean B. Carroll, who summarizes such a matter of fact with the fol-
lowing motto: «Existing genes and structures provide the means for 
innovation» [Carroll 2005, 288]. In other words: in force of their nature 
– which is the element of invariance – living beings are structurally 
forms of givenness ontologically new, unexpected and unpredictable.
What we are facing here is a delicate balance analysed by Monod 
in his famous book Chance and Necessity – a work which is today 
outdated as regards some assertions, but not as regards the ontological 
paradigm proposed by him. According to it living reality gives itself 
between the existence of structures endowed with the “property of in-
variance” and the “occurrence of perturbations” in these structures [cf. 
Monod 1970/1972, 29]. Certainly, our point of view about life and living 
beings is today quite different from the claim underlined by Monod in 
the seventies: «We would like to think ourselves necessary, inevitable, 
ordained from all eternity. All religions, nearly all philosophies, and 
even a part of science testify to the unwearying, heroic effort of man-
kind desperately denying its own contingency» [Monod 1970/1972, 44]. 
Instead, today the prevalent perspective is opposite, if we consider the 
“principle of weakness” lying at the base of the different disciplines. 
For instance, theology has become weak in order to save human con-
tingency and finiteness; philosophy centralizes the role of contingency 
and otherness as well as the plastic nature of life;11 the life sciences have 
11  The notion of plasticity plays a fundamental role in the book by Catherine Ma-
labou with the paradigmatic title Ontologie de l’accident. Essai sur la plasticité 




since long abandoned “orthogenetic” visions and liberated the evolu-
tional processes from the teleologic criterion by pointing out the pres-
ence of an irregular zig-zag movement in living beings. Manfred Eigen 
and Ruthild Winkler highlight this in a volume with an emblematic 
title: Das Spiel. They warn us that the game is a «Naturphänomen, das 
in seiner Dichotomie von Zufall und Notwendigkeit allem Geschehen 
zugrunde liegt» [Eigen & Winkler 1975, 11]. There is a clear Goethean 
morphologic perspective that lies at the core of this ontological vision 
of natural life between necessity and contingency. As is well known, 
Goethe considers metamorphosis as a “venerable” but at the same time 
“dangerous gift” («höchst ehrwürdige, aber zugleich höchst gefärhliche 
Gabe» [Goethe 2000, 35])12 since it is tension, “game” between two 
forces, namely the vis centrifuga and the vis centripeta, the “subver-
sive” one which destroys the form (and hence the knowledge) and the 
“conservative” one which is like a tenacious resistance that on the con-
trary preserves the form. Such an image of metamorphosis as a dialectic 
between the tension towards destruction and dispersion and the tenden-
cy to persistence can be described referring to Eigen’s and Winkler’s 
analysis of the form of living beings:
Das Erscheinungsbild der Wirklichkeit ist stark strukturiert. 
Konservative Kraftwirkungen frieren den Zufall ein und schaf-
fen beständige Formen und Muster. Dynamische Ordnungszu-
stände entstehen aus der zeitlichen Synchronisation physikali-
scher und chemischer Prozesse unter ständiger Dissipation von 
Energie. Die Ordnung des Lebens baut auf dem „konservati-
ven“ wie auch auf dem „dissipativen“ Prinzip auf. Die Gestalt 
der Lebewesen, die Gestalthaftigkeit der Ideen, sie beide haben 
ihren Ursprung im Wechselspiel von Zufall und Gesetz [Eigen 
& Winkler 1975, 87].
12  Cf. Goethe 1988, 43: «The idea of metamorphosis deserves great reverence, but it 
is also a most dangerous gift from above. It leads to formlessness; it destroys know-
ledge, dissolves it. It is like the vis centrifuga, and would be lost in the infinite if it 
had no counterweight; here I mean the drive for specific character, the stubborn per-
sistence of things which have finally attained reality. This is a vis centripeta which 
remains basically untouched by any external factor».
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At this point, how can we read life-world in front of the aporia of the 
intelligibility of an order which escapes an aprioristic eidetics since it is 
essentially determined in a part by chance, but which cannot be reduced 
only at the level of an empirical variable because of the presence of a 
certain permanent necessity? The question of the legibility of the world 
is expressly posed by Blumenberg who asks whether «phenomena can 
“be read”, reality can be spelled as if it were exposed in an open book, 
whose characters await only to be deciphered» [Bodei 1984, ix].13
We could proceed in this way, if living reality were marked only by 
the order of necessary rules and by the trait of generality. But we are 
discussing on forms of life that are structurally marked by their own ac-
cidental singularity. Blumenberg offers us a Theorie der Unbegrifflich-
keit which has its strong point in a “weak” idea of concept. Exactly this 
is the fertile and epistemologically fruitful aspect of his thought which 
allows a use of metaphors in front of a reality which eludes every rigid 
conceptual determination. Blumenberg explains that a concept must be 
undetermined enough to grasp the concrete with its novelty in compar-
ison to that which is already met and experienced.14
It is a significant change in the idea that concepts are able to catch 
reality according to a vision which believes that concepts are ways to fix 
things against their dispersion and their escaping from our gaze. Blu-
menberg, however, is aware that the concept is the result of an actio per 
distans, inasmuch as it is operative in the distance from its object as a 
kind of its replacement. By its nature as a substitute – which reminds 
of Heidegger’s meaning of phenomenon as Erscheinung in the sense of 
das Meldende [cf. Heidegger 1927/1993, 29-30]15 – a concept is as an im-
13  All the quotations from Bodei’s essay are my own translation.
14  Cf. Blumenberg 2007, 11-12: «Der Begriff muß genügend Unbestimmtheit be-
sitzen, um solche herankommenden Erfahrungen noch so erfassen zu können, daß 
entsprechend zweckmäßige Einstellungen auf sie auch dann bezogen werden kön-
nen, wenn im Detail in der vollen Konkretion Abweichungen von vergangenen Er-
fahrungen bestehen».
15  According to Heidegger, phenomenon as Erscheinung means that the thing (the 
proper phenomenon in strict, “original” meaning) never shows itself by itself, but 
through something other which makes it known («The expression “appearance” itself 
in turn can have a double meaning. First, appearing in the sense of making itself 
known as something that does not show itself and, second, in the sense of what does 
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age or a representation, actually «das Instrument […] der entspannten 
Vergegenwärtigung des Nicht-Anwesenden» [Blumenberg 2007, 27]. In 
this way, as a substitute open to the novelty of reality the concept is above 
all «das Instrument einer Anwartschaft auf neue Gegenwärtigkeit, neue 
Anschauung» [Blumenberg 2007, 27]. In short: without concepts we can-
not observe anything, neither in the first nor in the second moment (name-
ly in the time of the experience and in that of reflection) since the concept 
performs the same phenomenological function that Heidegger attributes 
to the logos as deloun.16 The concept is a kind of manifestation. But it is a 
manifestation of manifestation, given the phenomenic character of reality. 
It means that the possibility for a concept to reveal reality lies in a prior 
availability of the latter to be a phenomenon, to gives itself to us in a man-
ifestation. Because of this primitive openness of reality to us the concept 
can be a sort of facilitation for the «Verfügbarkeit des Gegenstandes […] 
abrufbar zu machen» [Blumenberg 2007, 28].
This phenomenological thesis corresponds to Goethe’s trust under-
lying the morphological project and in a way still grounding life sci ences 
today. It is a trust not in the cognitive human possibilities, but rather 
in the phenomenic ones of natural life. Blumenberg is careful to refer 
back to Goethe’s words in the Ergänzungen zur Farbenlehre – (a phe-
nomenon means: «in seiner ganzen Einfalt erscheinen, seine Herkunft 
aussprechen und auf die Folgerung hindeuten») which he comments 
in this way: «The Goethean pragmatics of knowledge is determined by 
the belief that man does not force his way into nature as an intruder but 
always already enjoys the richest communion with truth from the midst 
of nature and by virtue of its favor» [Blumenberg 1960/2010, 29].
the making itself known – what in its self-showing indicates something that does not 
show itself» [Heidegger 1927/1996, 26]). In this way the concept Erscheinung marks 
the presence of an absence and the necessity of a substitute for the phenomenality. In 
a way, Blumenberg’s metaphorology depends on a similar dialectic of presence and 
absence in phenomenality, as I will try to show.
16  Cf. Heidegger 1927/1996, 28: «Rather, logos as speech really means dēloun, to 
make manifest “what is being talked about” in speech. Aristotle explicates this 
function of speech more precisely as apophainesthai. Logos lets something be seen 
(phainesthai), namely what is being talked about, and indeed for the speaker (who 
serves as the medium) or for those who speak with each other. Speech “lets us see,” 
from itself, apo…, what is being talked about».
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Hence, the notion of concept as deloun gives us a fertile heuris-
tic possibility, inasmuch as we recognize that concepts “constitute ob-
jects”17 and are “representation of representation” («Vorstellung der 
Vorstellung»),18 i.e., reduplications that reveal a transcendental opening 
of subjectivity to reality – of course, with all the problems that the open-
ness of the knowing subject to the world as its object of knowledge im-
plies. However, the thesis relevant for us is the fact that the presence of 
concepts – as Blumenberg suggests us – marks the absence of phenome-
na19 and this is a stalemate for us since it is the fundamental question on 
the validity of our knowledge. Such a question is typical of each theory 
that comes after the mere empirical experience of phenomena. In order 
to get around it Blumenberg offers us an epistemologically important 
use of metaphor. Since the metaphor «nutzt […] eine Stelle schwacher 
Determination aus» [Blumenberg 2007, 61], it dribbles the restrictions 
of too strong determinations such as the concept of an essence as a 
marker of a closed and immobile identity.20
Indeed, Blumenberg is convinced that the metaphorical way can 
be helpful for establishing «a more friendly and trusting relationship» 
with nature [Bodei 1984, xix]. In this manner it would be possible for 
us to «discover a hidden and forgotten wealth of meanings» and create 
«a new way of relating to the world» [Bodei 1984, xix]. From this point 
of view, then, our language as well as our concepts, our images and our 
representations are not merely a means between us and the phenomena. 
They have rather a heuristic function in continuity with the human, 
17  Cf. Blumenberg 2007, 40: «Begriffe beruhen nicht nur auf Gegenständen, sondern 
Begriffe konstituieren auch Gegenstände».
18  Cf. Blumenberg 2007, 40. If a phenomenon shows itself through a representation, 
then a concept is a representation of a representation according to the logic that a 
concept is itself an object of representation.
19  Actually, it is so also for Husserl, who considers that the object in the eidetic intu-
ition is given as if it would be present in flesh and blood, even if it is not materially 
in this way. That is not only since it is impossible for a material phenomenon to be 
literally contained by the “space” of the consciousness in its extension, but rather 
since the power of the concept is to “recall in presence” a phenomenon which is not 
hic et nunc in front of us.
20  I do not completely agree with Blumenberg on this aspect since in my opinion a lot 
depends on the content that the concept brings in itself.
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albeit in a sense impossible, desire that the world can reveal itself in 
the exact predictability of its phenomena, giving itself generously and 
gratuitously in the complex of its meaning as «a totality of nature, life 
and history»:
Der Wunsch, die Welt möge sich in der anderen Weise als der der 
bloßen Wahrnehmung und sogar der exakten Vorhersagbarkeit 
ihrer Erscheinungen zugänglich erweisen: im Aggregatzustand 
der ‚Lesbarkeit‘ als ein Ganzes von Natur, Leben und Geschich-
te sinnspendend sich erschließen, ist gewiß kein naturwüchsiges 
Bedürfnis, wie es das der Magie ist, über unbeherrschte Gewal-
ten Macht zu gewinnen. Dennoch gehört dieser Wunsch zum 
Inbegriff des Sinnverlangens an die Realität, gerichtet auf ihre 
vollkommenste und nicht mehr gewaltsame Verfügbarkeit [Blu-
menberg 1983, 10].
Our desire is nothing more than our request to reality to which we ask 
not only to become visible to us, but to give us its sense according to 
that kind of principle which Erich Rothacker defined as Satz der Be-
deutsamkeit and which Blumenberg takes up as the matrix of our desire 
through which we establish our relationship with phenomena. There is 
again something of Goethe’s logic in this hermeneutic phenomenology: 
nature, defined by Goethe as a lebendiges Buch, may still not be under-
stood (unverstanden), but it is not incomprehensible (unverständlich).21 
It means that the order of significance is not merely phenomenal in the 
sense of a relationship of a simple mirroring of the phenomena in our 
theories. Rather it is a much more problematic relationship. The prob-
lem is not that things do not manifest themselves, or that they do it only 
partially. For Goethe, who often seems to be a hard, more Husserlian 
phenomenologist than Husserl himself, saying that a thing does not in-
dicate what it is, is affirming that it is not what it is.22 Nevertheless, is 
the opposite possible?
21  Cf. Goethe’s verses in the poetic letter Mein altes Evangelium to Johann Heinrich 
Merck, later published with the title Sendschrieben: «Sieh / so ist die Nature in Buch 
lebendig, / Unverstanden doch nicht unverständlich» [Goethe 1950, 393].
22  Cf. Goethe 1952, 629: «[E]ine Sache zeige nicht an, was sie sei, heißt ebensoviel 
als sagen, sie sei nicht, was sie sei».
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Actually, phenomenology teaches us that der Schein is also a case 
of phenomenality, but the transit from the being (essence) of the phe-
nomenon to its appearing is interrupted by a sort of manifestation that 
turns our gaze away from the truth of the phenomenon. However, with-
out opening these specifically phenomenological questions, it is impor-
tant to underline that according to Blumenberg the metaphor is not a 
dissolution of the limits of our sensible and empirical perception of the 
givenness of natural phenomena, but rather it is the “device” for a kind 
of self-recovery for our language (and hence for our rational commit-
ment) whose scarcity and weakness we do constantly experience. Over-
coming the ancient, blind, epistemological trust in the «perfect con-
gruence of logos and cosmos» [Blumenberg 1960/2010, 2] since «for 
antiquity, the logos was fundamentally adequate to the totality of what 
exits» [Blumenberg 1960/2010, 2], we discover indeed that the poverty 
in our relationship with the phenomena is the poverty of our language 
emerging from the way in which the language forms itself before a re-
ality whose givenness is chaotic and irreducible to static models: «Die 
Armut unseres Wirklichkeitsbezuges (inmitten des Reichtums unserer 
Möglichkeitsbeziehung) ist nicht erst eine Armut der Erkenntnis, der 
Wahrheit, der Theorie, sondern schon eine solche der Sprache, die 
sich innerhalb des lebensweltlichen Horizontes der nichtmodalisierten 
Gegebenheit ausbildet» [Blumenberg 2007, 88]. Our use of metaphors 
is not a mere arbitrary game, but rather a kind of cure, a remedy that 
allows us to meet reality, also in its dispersion and its disappearance. 
In epistemological terms, the use of “metaphorical devices” is precious 
because of its power of safeguarding the contingency. In this sense, 
the metaphorical method seems to be an alternative to the eidetic one 
which purifies reality from its dirty matter through the transcendental 
reduction. The fact is that our scientific theories, hence also the biolog-
ical ones, resort to the device of absolute metaphors, that is, of those 
metaphors that «prove resistant to terminological claims and cannot be 
dissolved into conceptuality» [Blumenberg 1960/2010, 5].23 Obviously, 
metaphors neither express a complete, strict truth nor offer definitive 
answers, but they help us to inhabit the “texture” of reality as a totality 
23  Eigen’s and Winkler’s game as well as the idea of a cyphered reality or of a codex 
of life are examples of absolute metaphors.
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which as such is never «nonexperienceable, nonapprehensible» [Blu-
menberg 1960/2010, 14].
It is evident that here we are in front of the bottleneck between the 
option for what Canguilhem defines «a crystalline (i.e., transparent and 
inert) intellectualism» [Canguilhem 1952/2008, xvii] – which is for in-
stance the method of an unmitigated eidetics – and the abandonment to 
the blind mistrust that there is no constant in life-world since contingen-
cy is a strange, dark and inaccessible entity which guides life as it pleas-
es. Nevertheless, when Canguilhem warns us that «[l]ife is formation 
of forms, knowledge is the analysis of in-formed matter» [Canguilhem 
1952/2008, xix], he perhaps offers us the hope of reconciling the needs 
of a knowledge that feeds on the aprioristic claims of a transcendental 
perspective and those of all scholars who point out that without expe-
rience we have nowhere to go. Knowledge as the analysis of in-formed 
matter means that we must not dismember life-world in rigid conceptu-
al forms. Rather, our duty is an inquiry able to look at living in-formed 
matters as «totalities whose sense resides in their tendency to realize 
themselves as such in the course of their confrontation with their mi-
lieu» [Canguilhem 1952/2008, xix]. According to this methodological 
principle Canguilhem can therefore affirm that living forms «can be 
grasped in a vision, never by a division» [Canguilhem 1952/2008, xix], 
namely not through a rigid determination of their definitory content, 
which does not consider all variability of their existence hic et nunc 
proper of each living form in its milieu, historicity, etc. In phenomeno-
logical terms, it means the necessity to face every singular living form 
in its individuality according to the different ways through which each 
form shows itself by itself in its being a form of counter-intentionali-
ty. All that implies consequently that the rational commitment in our 
knowledge of living reality has to respect life as an original phenom-
enon that as such always precedes the knowledge about it that we can 
elaborate. Recognizing the dependence of the living being on some-
thing other than its own essence (like contingency and variable alterity) 
is a decisive step in order to understand how living beings are a complex 
relational plot, which can be neither simply reduced to the model of a 
pure subjectivity nor hypostatized in the ontological one of an immobile 
substance whose components must be studied. In other words: each liv-
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ing form cannot be described as the mere sum of its parts. In this sense, 
Canguilhem’s observation about the nature of the organisms used for 
medical or biomedical research is very precious: «Within a given living 
species, the principal methodological difficulty concerns finding indi-
vidual representatives capable of sustaining tests of addition, subtrac-
tion, or measured variation of a phenomenon’s supposed components, 
tests instituted in order to compare an intentionally modified organism 
to a control organism, that is, an organism left to its spontaneous biolog-
ical fate» [Canguilhem 1952/2008, 12-13].
Such a state of affairs would have an absolute ontological legitima-
cy, namely even outside the rooms of a laboratory, if the living forms 
were closed, monadic systems, but, as we said, the complexity of the 
living being makes it an open system, that is, an organism – as Mayr 
would affirm – «constituted in such a way that additional information 
can be incorporated during a lifetime, acquired through learning, con-
ditioning, or other experiences» [Mayr 2004, 54]. Among these “other” 
experiences I consider also the continuous ones of birth of the Self and 
of its metamorphosis, according to the plastic character of the living 
being. Still, Canguilhem is very careful to note that often the object of 
our knowledge is not exactly what it is as a given in nature. Taking the 
example of the science of crystals, he emphasizes that crystals undoubt-
edly present themselves as a given object:
Ainsi l’objet cristal a, relativement à la science qui le prend 
pour objet d’un savoir à obtenir, une indépendance à l’égard du 
discours, ce qui fait que l’on dit l’objet naturel. Cet objet naturel, 
hors de tout discours tenu sur lui, n’est pas, bien entendu, 
l’objet scientifique. La nature n’est pas d’elle-même découpée et 
répartie en objets et en phénomènes scientifique. C’est la science 
qui consti tue son objet à partir du moment où elle a inventé 
une méthode pour former, par des propositions capables d’être 
composées intégralement, une théorie contrôlée par le souci de 
la prendre en faute [Canguilhem 1968, 16-17].
Such a remark is crucial. The object of life sciences is not the pure vital 
in itself or life as such, physei, as Aristotle would say. Elsewhere, Can-
guilhem affirms that in biology now «[l]a vie est étudiée au plus près 
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de la non-vie, à l’état maximum de dénuement de ses attributs tradi-
tionnels» [Canguilhem 1977, 115]. There is, therefore, an inevitable and 
perhaps even in some cases aporetic discrepancy and fracture between 
what is for us and what is by nature and there is no doubt that living 
phenomena actually risk to be not protected and saved at all by the rav-
enousness of our cognitive desire, of our absolute claim to truth. Never-
theless, in my opinion, there is no way to absolutely avoid this danger, if 
not precisely by providing control tools for the totalizing and dictatorial 
power of the eidetics as a strong, constitutive and fruitful structure of 
epistemic knowledge. It is the intellectual honesty that Bachelard calls 
l’engagement rationaliste [cf. Bachelard 1972] in which, perhaps, the 
very role of philosophy is played according to its critical nature in its 
dialogue with the eidetics of life. As Canguilhem humorously affirms, 
«la fonction propre de la philosophie est de compliquer l’existence de 
l’homme, y compris l’existence de l’historien des sciences» [Canguil-
hem 1977, 139] and, I would add, of the life scientist.
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Abstract
Saving living phenomena means saving their contingency, their plasticity, their indi-
viduality. A fruitful dialogue between metaphysics, phenomenology and morphology 
can be of help to investigate the ontological question of form, giving us the possibility 
to investigate the question of form and its epistemological significance providing a 
revision of that eidetic approach which instead is in danger of losing the sense of the 
continuous plastic morphogenesis of living beings.
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